الأمان
Designed so there is nothing to find.
The safest data is data that does not exist. Tacuit is built around that one idea.
Who can see what
One row for everyone who might be looking. Green means they cannot see it.
| Who is looking | What you wrote | Who you talk to | When you talk | Your network address |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Our server | NoNever. It only ever holds sealed blocks. | PartlyNot from the messages. It could try to match the network addresses of two connections. | YesIt sees sealed blocks arrive and leave. | YesLike any website. A VPN or Tor hides it. |
| Someone else's relay | NoNever. It holds the same sealed blocks ours does. | PartlyNot from the messages. It could try to match the network addresses of two connections. | YesIt sees sealed blocks arrive and leave. | YesWhen you send to it or collect from it. A VPN or Tor hides it. |
| Your network or Wi-Fi | NoNever. | NoOnly that you use this site. | PartlyYes, unless Constant traffic is on. Then every moment looks the same. | YesIt is your own network. |
| Someone who takes the server later | NoNothing is kept, and the keys that sealed it are gone. | PartlyWe keep no lists and no logs. The hosting company's own access logs may show addresses and times. | PartlyOnly what the hosting company's logs show. | PartlyOnly what the hosting company's logs show. |
| Someone who takes your device | NoNothing is stored. Not one message. | PartlyBurner session: nothing. Kept identity: your list, unless a passphrase lock seals it. | NoThere is no history. | NoIt is not recorded. |
| The person you talk to | YesOf course. And they can photograph their screen. | YesThey know it is you, by the name you chose. | YesThey are there. | PartlyNever passed on, except on a direct link, where each device sees the other's address. |
The design in one paragraph
Your device creates its own keys and never sends them anywhere. Every message is encrypted on your device, travels through our server as sealed ciphertext, and is decrypted only on the other person's device. The server is a relay: it holds a sealed message in the database's memory only, never in its data files until it is collected, and for no more than 30 seconds. There are no accounts, so there is no list of users. There is no history, so there is nothing to subpoena, leak or steal.
التشفير
- Each identity is a P-256 key pair created in your browser. The private key is marked non-exportable, so even the page itself cannot read it out.
- Before any message is sent, the two devices agree a session using short-lived keys that exist only in memory and are replaced every minute. Message content only ever travels under these session keys.
- This gives forward secrecy. Once a session key is thrown away, the messages sent under it cannot be opened again, even by someone who later gets your device, your passphrase and a full recording of the traffic.
- Each message is sealed twice with AES-256-GCM. The inner layer uses the session key, mixed with a secret only the two of you share, which proves who it came from. The outer layer uses a fresh one-time key for every message, which hides the sender.
- On top of that, every session mixes in a secret from ML-KEM-768, a quantum-resistant key exchange standardised by NIST. To read a recorded conversation, an attacker would have to break both. The ML-KEM code is the open source @noble/post-quantum library, which has not had an independent audit, so it is only ever used as an extra layer, never alone.
- Nothing is signed. A message proves itself to the person it was sent to, but it cannot later be shown to anyone else as proof that you wrote it.
- Every sealed block is exactly the same size. A long message, a one word reply, a read receipt, a handshake and a group message all look identical on the wire.
- Ongoing traffic does not go to the address in your link. Each pair of people uses its own mailbox address that changes every ten minutes, so stored traffic cannot be tied to a person or followed over time.
- Group messages are sealed separately for each member. The relay never sees that a group exists.
- With Constant traffic on, the app sends one request of a fixed size and gets one answer of a fixed size on a fixed beat, whether or not there is anything to say. A message rides inside a beat that would have happened anyway, so someone watching your connection cannot tell a busy minute from a quiet one. It uses about 25 MB an hour, and files and voice notes are off while it is on.
- Each file is encrypted with its own random 256-bit key, sent inside a sealed message. Pieces are bound to their position, so they cannot be swapped or dropped without detection.
- Old or replayed messages are refused.
مرحّلات كثيرة
There is no central server. A relay is any copy of Tacuit, run by anyone, and the app can use several at once.
- Your link names the relay you collect from, and any backup you added. To reach you, the other person's device sends the sealed block straight to your relay. Relays never talk to each other, and there is no directory of relays or of people.
- A relay run by a stranger sees exactly what ours sees: sealed blocks of one size with no names on them, and the network address of whoever connects.
- If your first relay cannot be reached, the sender's app tries your backup by itself. You collect from both.
- An open relay answers other copies of the app with no cookies and no logins in play. Its operator can close it, so that it serves only its own app.
- Constant traffic covers conversations on your own relay. A message sent to another relay is a separate connection, and someone watching can see that connection being made.
رسائل مع حامل
For when there is no live connection. The message is sealed on your device and becomes a link or a QR code that you carry to the other person any way you like.
- It is sealed with a fresh one-time key to the other person's long-term key, with AES-256-GCM, and mixed with the secret only the two of you share. It names no sender on the outside.
- It holds up to 160 characters. It opens within seven days, on the device that holds the other person's identity, and only if you are already in their list.
- There is no forward secrecy here, because there is no live exchange to agree one-minute keys over. Someone who recorded the code and later gets the other person's unlocked device could open it. Use it for what must get through, not for what must never be read.
- The app refuses to open the same courier message twice. That memory lasts while the app is open. After a restart, a code that was kept could be opened again until its seven days end, so destroy the code once it is read.
Direct link
Two devices can link to each other with no server in between.
- Pairing takes two codes: one device shows a code, the other takes it in and shows a reply. The codes pass by QR code or any other way. No server takes part and no outside helper servers are used.
- Messages on the link are the same sealed blocks a relay would carry, with the same one-minute keys, inside the link's own encryption.
- It works on the same Wi-Fi or hotspot with the internet down. Across the internet it only works when the two devices can reach each other's addresses directly.
- Each device sees the other's network address. Do not pair with someone who must not learn where you are.
- The link lasts while both apps are open. When it closes, the app says so and goes back to the relays.
نسخة بلا اتصال
- Off by default. When you switch it on, your browser keeps the app's own files so the app opens with no connection. It never holds messages, keys or contact lists.
- When there is a connection it always fetches the live app, so it does not hold you on old code. The code fingerprint works the same either way.
- It is a background script, which is the kind of thing the device check warns about. The check knows this one by its address. Switching it off, or a wipe, removes it.
What the server holds
- Sealed messages and file pieces, in the database's memory only, never in its data files. Reading deletes. Anything uncollected is deleted after 30 seconds.
- No accounts, names, emails, phone numbers or contact lists.
- Flooding is held back by a small puzzle each sender's device must solve per message. It identifies nobody, and it gets steeply harder as a mailbox fills.
- No message history and no backups of messages, because there is nothing to back up.
- No cookies, no analytics, no advertising, and no scripts or fonts from any other company.
What stays on your device
- In a burner session: nothing. Your identity lives in the tab's memory and dies with it.
- If you choose to stay reachable: your identity, contact list and settings, in this browser only. Never messages, never files.
- With a passphrase lock, that device copy is encrypted. The passphrase goes through PBKDF2 (600,000 rounds) and then scrypt (32 MB of memory per guess) before it becomes an AES-256-GCM key, so guessing it costs both time and memory. Ten wrong tries wipe it. A duress passphrase wipes it at once and opens an empty app.
ضد برامج التجسس
No app can beat spyware that already controls the device. These make its work harder and tell you when something shows itself.
- Injection alarm. The app watches its own page. The moment a browser extension or other software adds an element, a frame, a script or a marker to it, the app stops and names what was added.
- On-screen keys. The passphrase and messages can be typed on keys drawn on the page, in a new order each time for the passphrase. Nothing passes through the real keyboard, so software or hardware that records keystrokes gets nothing.
- Device check. One tap looks for changed app code, background scripts registered for the site, a browser that says other software is driving it, extra displays, a wrong clock and a missing passphrase lock.
- Password managers and autofill are told to stay out of the passphrase box.
- The page refuses to run any script it did not ship, and refuses to load anything from another site.
- There is nothing to take afterwards. No history, no files, and no keys that open past messages.
- The limit: software that only watches the screen leaves nothing for a web page to notice. Hold to read and the cover screen reduce what it can capture. They do not stop it.
Protection on the screen
- Screen shield blurs the conversation whenever the window is not in front.
- Hold to read keeps every message covered until you press and hold it.
- Capture alarm blacks out the screen when a screenshot key is pressed and tells the other person.
- Cover screen turns the app into a plain notes page at a keystroke. With Cover identity on, a locked app opens as that notes page and the passphrase is typed into its search box.
- Mask typing shows dots instead of letters while you write.
- Copying, selecting, dragging and printing messages are switched off. What you type is not offered to spell check or writing assistant services.
What it does not protect against
We would rather you know the limits than find them.
- A camera, or a screenshot tool the browser cannot see. No website can block screen capture. Phones in particular give web pages no way to detect it.
- A device that is already compromised. If someone controls your phone or computer, they see what you see.
- The person you are talking to. They can always remember, retype or photograph what you sent.
- The timing of your messages, unless you turn on Constant traffic. Without it, someone who can watch both people's connections at once could notice that one sends just before the other receives.
- Network observers seeing that you connected to this site. They cannot see what you sent or to whom, but they can see the connection. A VPN or Tor hides that.
- Extensions and keyboards. A browser extension that can read the page, or a third party keyboard on a phone, can see what you type. Use a clean browser with no extensions.
- A full blackout, beyond the same room and what you can carry. A website cannot use Bluetooth or radio, cannot pass messages from phone to phone, cannot receive while it is closed, and cannot be opened for the first time without a connection.
- Who talks to whom, against a future quantum computer. Message content has a quantum-resistant layer. The outer envelope that hides the sender does not yet.
- The site itself being changed. Like every web app, your browser runs the code this site sends. Safety numbers protect you from someone in the middle, not from a server that has been taken over. The code fingerprint helps here: the app shows a fingerprint of the code it is running and warns you when it differs from last time. That catches a quiet change. It cannot catch an attacker who also rewrites the part that does the checking.
For the technical reader
- Key agreement: ECDH on P-256. Key derivation: HKDF-SHA-256. Cipher: AES-256-GCM. All from the browser's built-in Web Crypto. The one exception is the extra ML-KEM-768 layer: browsers do not offer it yet, so it comes from an open source library that has not had an independent audit, and it is never used alone.
- Passphrase lock: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256 with 600,000 rounds, then scrypt with N 32,768, r 8, p 1. scrypt comes from the open source @noble/hashes library, which had an independent audit at version 1.0.0. The version used here is 2.4.0. It runs after the browser's own PBKDF2, never instead of it.
- Code fingerprint: SHA-256 over the SHA-256 of each app file in load order, shown as 24 hex characters. The browser and the server work it out separately, so the two can be compared.
- Constant traffic: every request is padded to 6,144 characters and every answer to 4,096, one of each every 1.5 seconds, carrying at most one sealed block each way.
- Session keys: a fresh P-256 pair per conversation on each side, rotated every 60 seconds, combined with the static shared secret through HKDF. Handshakes carry keys only, never content, and are the same size as a short message.
- Mailbox address: SHA-256 of a random 32 byte secret. Senders know the address. Only the holder of the secret can collect.
- Every app file carries a SHA-384 fingerprint in the page. The browser refuses to run a file that was changed on the way by a CDN, a cache or anything else between the server and you.
- If the operator runs an onion service, the site advertises it to Tor Browser with an Onion-Location header.
- The relay accepts POST only, so mailbox secrets never appear in a web address or in standard server logs.
- The app page is served with a strict Content Security Policy (scripts from this site only, no inline script, no framing), enforced Trusted Types, and Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy and Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy set to same-origin. On an open relay the page may also connect to other relays over https. On a closed relay it may connect to this site only, and the relay refuses cross-site browser calls.
- Courier message: a one-time P-256 public key (65 bytes), a 4 byte hint, a 12 byte nonce, then AES-256-GCM over the time, timer, a random id and the text. The key comes from HKDF-SHA-256 over the one-time exchange and the pair's static secret.
- Direct link: a WebRTC data channel with no STUN or TURN servers. The offer and the answer are squeezed into links short enough for a QR code.
- Relay discovery: the app asks a relay's own address for its doors and limits. The answer names nothing else.